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WELFARIST AND NON-WELFARIST CONCEPTIONS OF 
"HEALTH PROMOTION"  
 






Although "health promotion" programs account for only a small proportion of health 
spending in OECD countries (OECD, 2000), their components (anti-smoking, pro-exercise 
and vaccination campaigns, for example) are often highly visible instruments of health policy. 
Furthermore, the case f or increased spending on such programs is likely to intensify if 
evidence of (i) their effectiveness; and (ii) diminishing returns to spending on other categories 
of health services (e.g., curative and acute medical services), grows. Economists' 
contributions to the literatures on, inter alia, (i) rational addiction; (ii) (licit and illicit) drug 
use; (iii) health production; and (iv) health sector economic evaluation; are pertinent to this 
health sub-sector. However, no integrated economic conception of the field of health 
promotion has been produced. This paper provides such an account: the instruments and 
targets of health promotion are analysed in an integrated framework by drawing on concepts 
from the public economics and health economics literatures. T he analyses emphasise the 
material differences in welfare outcomes that can arise, depending on whether the objective of 
a health promotion program is to maximise welfare, or to pursue another, e.g. health-stock, 
objective. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Programs that are designed to modify health status via non-clinical means, especially by 
modifying consumer behaviour, are commonplace in the health sector. Although expenditure 
on "public health and prevention" programs still constitutes a relatively small proportion of 
total health expenditures in most OECD countries, this proportion has increased in recent 
years in most countries for which data are available (see, e.g. OECD, 2000). One explanation 
for the growth of such programs is that there is an expectation, amongst policy makers, that 
the marginal products of these programs will exceed, or equal, that of marginal allocations to 
acute and curative medical care. 
 
Economists have made a number of important contributions to the public health literature. 
The literatures on health production, rational addiction, and economic evaluation, for 
example, each contain pertinent contributions. Yet, no integrated economic treatment of the 
field of health promotion has been produced. Is this lacuna of any importance? There are 
several reasons to respond in the affirmative. 
                                                 
*  Senior Lecturer in Economics, Brisbane Graduate School of Business, Queensland University of Technology, 
GPO Box 2434, (2 George Street), BRISBANE QLD 4001, AUSTRALIA, tel.: +61 7 3864 4008 (w), +61 7 
3864 4018 (message), +61 7 3870 5244 (home), fax.: +61 7 3864 1299, email: l.connelly@qut.edu.au. 
 
 2 
First, the field of health promotion is now not only academically distinct (in the health 
literature, for example), it is also a distinct, and growing, sector of the health economy in 
many countries. According to the OECD (2000), total spending on "prevention and public 
health" increased, as a proportion of total US health spending from 2.8 per cent, in 1960, to 
3.5 per cent in 1999. In Canada, the rate of relative growth has been much more dramatic: the 
proportion of total health expenditure on "prevention and public health" doubled from three 
per cent, in 1970, to 6.0 per cent in 1999. In fact, in only two OECD countries for which data 
are available, viz. Germany and Korea, has relative spending on this element of the health 
sector apparently decreased over the past few decades. Thus, by and large, it may be said that 
the "economic stakes" in this health sub-sector have increased. 
 
Second, the role of government in this sector is non-trivial. Although the relevant 
disaggregated data are not (readily) available, one may surmise that increased spending on 
health promotion is likely to be accompanied by growing public sector involvement in that 
field, be it in financing, provision, distribution, or all of these functions. Thus, it also appears 
increasingly important that the welfare effects of various health promotion strategies (and 
their potential interdependence with the objective, target, and instrument selected) should be 
clarified. Since the welfare losses generated by erroneous policies are likely to be amplified, 
not only by the size of the policy miscalculations, but the magnitude of the affected programs, 
so too the impetus for clear and careful policy formulation in this field grows. 
 
Finally, the non-economic literature on health promotion, while mostly united in purpose, 
does not appear to be united, conceptually, on the question "What is health promotion?" 
While the conceptual framework employed in this paper represents one of only a number of 
disciplines (i.e. economics) that might be brought to bear, its application sheds some light on 
a question to which a complete answer has not been given. Applications of other disciplines 
to address this same question may also be fruitful. 
 
The analysis conducted here is intended to address the key issues outlined above. The 
theoretical basis of the conceptual work presented in this paper is Becker's (1965) model of 
household production and Grossman's (1972) lauded application of it to health production 
and intertemporal utility maximisation. (A brief mathematical statement of Grossman's 
(1972) model is contained in Appendix 1.) However, some economies of exposition have 
been necessary and it is useful to outline some of these at the outset. First, although the 
notions of social welfare and welfare maximisation are central, aggregate analyses invoking 
social welfare functions, utility possibility frontiers, and so on, are eschewed here. For the 
purposes of this paper, analyses at the level of the individual consumer-producer are be 
sufficient to illustrate the central principles of importance. Second, the focus of this paper is 
explicitly on health promotion schemes that involve information dissemination. This focus is 
adopted largely to the exclusion of considerations of other sources of market failure (see, e.g. 
Bator, 1957) and is adopted for reasons of space. It is, of course, recognised that market 
failure can arise for a variety of reasons - externalities, public goods and market power are 
also potential sources of welfare loss - however, a discussion of these is extraneous to the 
central task of this paper. Finally, the inter-temporal dimensions of the Grossman (1972) 
framework are suppressed for the purposes o f this paper. This issue is afforded further 
discussion, below. 
 
The contents of the paper are arranged as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
several conceptions of "health promotion" from the non-economic literature. The purpose of 3 
this Section is to set the economic analysis in the context of the field it seeks to represent. 
Section 3 produces an economic conception of health promotion: it explores the implications 
of different assumptions about policy objectives and the influence of these on the instruments 
and targets of health promotion policies and, importantly, welfare outcomes. Section 4 
concludes that in health promotion, as in other fields of public policy, a clear statement of 
objectives, and the selection of consistent instruments and targets are non-trivial 
considerations. 
 
2.  "WHAT IS HEALTH PROMOTION?" A NON-ECONOMIC ANSWER 
 
The question "what is health promotion?" continues to de-energize all those involved in this 
activity…(Ashton and Seymour, 1998). 
 
Economic discussions of industries are sometimes subject to boundary disputes concerning 
the inclusion and exclusion of particular types of firms. Consensus on a core of elements is 
usually not difficult to achieve (e.g., that hospitals qualify as part of the health sector is 
uncontroversial), while other elements are subject to disagreement (e.g., whether or not 
nursing homes "qualify" as part of the health sector may be subject to disagreement). The 
(non-economic) literature on health promotion is also subject to boundary disputes.  It is 
worthwhile to consider several of the competing notions of health promotion, before 
proceeding to the economic analysis. 
 
First, it is useful to consider terminological issues. One source of disagreement in the health 
promotion literature derives from the ambiguity of the word "promotion". Jones & Naidoo 
(1997, p.75) are among the surprisingly few authors who recognise this source of ambiguity, 
explicitly, in their review of the field:  
 
[h]ealth promotion…has been defined in varied (sic) ways. The word "promotion" is an   ambiguous 
term and is used in relation both to raising someone's [health] status…and to   advertising or other 
campaigns to sell something. 
 
Dines & Cribb (1993, p.21) too, recognise this source of ambiguity. They write: 
   
The first [sense of the term "promotion"] derives from salesmanship: there may be a promotion for a 
particular product, whereby through audio-visual means and persuasive argument customers are 
encouraged to purchase what is on offer. In this way to promote is to sell, to put forward and to place in 
the forefront of attention.  
 
They argue that, when this (first) conception of the term promotion is adopted,  
   
[h]ealth promotion becomes placing the absence of disease, foundations for achievement and well-being in the 
forefront of attention. 
 
While the second sense of the term "promotion"  
 
…emanates from the workplace: a person may be promoted to a new position. Here promotion concerns raising 
to a higher level (Dines & Cribb, 1993, p.21). 
 
These different senses of the term promotion may have profound boundary implications for 
one's conception of the field. Taking the second sense of the term, in particular, it is difficult 
to conceive of any health sector activity that is not undertaken with a view to improving (or 
maintaining) some dimension of health, i.e. with raising health "to a higher level".
 Indeed, 4 
Tones (1985) clearly ascribes to this catholic conception of the field, defining health 
promotion as "any activity [that is] designed to foster health". According to this conception, 
even acute curative medical services (e.g., appendectomies) may apparently be considered 
part of health promotion. (More recently, the same author also suggested the following 
bizzararie: "...we might distil the concept of health promotion  into the following 
"quintessential" formula: health promotion = health education x public policy" (Tones, 1997, 
p.786).) 
 
It is more common, however, for authors on health promotion to exclude curative and acute 
medical services from their definitions of t he field. Ewles & Simnet (1995, p.24), for 
example, argue that the following World Health Organization (1984) definition: 
 
[h]ealth promotion is the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve, their health; 
 
excludes "…things which need to be done to people (like taking out their appendix or placing 
them in a foster home)…" - although this exclusivity is, arguably, not self-evident. 
 
Downie, Fyfe & Tannahill (1990) have also excluded curative and acute medical services 
from their conception of the field (Jones & Naidoo, 1997). This approach, while popular, is 
not universally accepted; rather, there is 
 
…continuing debate about whether health promotion should include disease reduction, prevention and health 
protection or whether it should be concerned solely with positive health. French (1990) has questioned why 
disease management shouldn't be included, whereas Downie et al. (1990) specifically excluded curative and 
acute medical services (Jones & Naidoo, 1997, p.76). 
 
Perhaps the most influential health promotion document of recent decades is The World 
Health Organization's (1986) Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion. In that document, health 
promotion was defined as follows: 
 
Health promotion is the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve, their health. To 
reach a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, an individual or group must be able to identify 
and to realize aspirations, to satisfy needs, and to change or cope with the environment. Health is, therefore, seen 
as a resource for everyday life, not the objective of living. Health is a positive concept emphasizing social and 
personal resources, as well as physical capacities. Therefore, health promotion is not just the responsibility of the 
health sector, but goes beyond healthy life-styles to well-being (World Health Organization, 1986, 
http://www.who.int/hpr/docs/ottawa.html).  
 
Once again, this definition encapsulates a very broad range of activities. Indeed, it not only 
includes health sector activities, but also explicitly encapsulates activities outside the health 
sector. 
 
Contrast these general conceptions of health promotion with the more exclusive taxonomy 
employed by the (US) Department of Health and Human Services (1980). That body 
employed 15 "objects of intervention" and classified these under 3 headings,  viz. (a) 
preventive health services, (b) health protection and (c) health promotion. The structure, 
which was invoked for planning health improvement strategies by the Department, was as 
follows: 
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(a)   Preventive Health Services 
•  High blood pressure control 
•  Family planning 
•  Pregnancy and infant care 
•  Immunisations 
•  Sexually transmitted diseases services 
 
(b) Health Protection 
•  Toxic agent control 
•  Occupational safety and health 
•  Accidental injury control 
•  Fluoridation of community water supplies 
•  Infectious agent control 
 
(c) Health Promotion 
•  Smoking cessation 
•  Reducing misuse of alcohol and drugs 
•  Improved nutrition 
•  Exercise and fitness 
•  Stress control 
(Department of Health and Human Services, 1980, p.386). 
 
 
Interestingly, there is no element of categories (a), (b) or (c) that is unconcerned with illness 
prevention or reduction. Consider category (c), "Health Promotion", in particular. Arguably, 
there is no element of category (c) that involves curative or acute medical care (although 
perhaps exceptions now exist in relation to the treatments for alcohol and drug "misuse", e.g. 
the use of acute "rapid detoxification" methods). Rather, the elements of this category, e.g. 
"Smoking cessation", "Reducing drug and alcohol misuse", "Exercise and fitness", etc., are 
items over which individuals themselves must exert control. Put another way, these elements 
appear principally to concern the behaviour, or choices, of individuals.  
 
The elements of category (a), on the other hand (such as "Blood pressure control", 
"Immunisations", and so on), although uniformly and actively involving consumer choice, 
also appear to involve the services of medical practitioners. For example, consumers must 
choose to be immunised and then invest their time to be vaccinated; but medical inputs (e.g. 
swabs, vaccines, syringes, medical labour and capital) are also involved. Put simply, the 
elements of category (a) appear to involve "doing things to" consumers. 
 
Finally, consider category (b), "Health Protection". Some elements of this category, e.g. 
"Occupational safety and health", "Fluoridation of community water supplies", "Infectious 
agent control", etc., seem to involve less active consumer participation than those of 
categories (a) and (c). In fact, in the case of water fluoridation individual consumers do not 
make any direct choice in relation to the consumption of fluoride - a decision to consume the 
water supplied by the municipal authorities constitutes a  de facto decision to c onsume 
fluoride. In this, and for each other element of (b), individual consumers who regard the 
outcomes as "bads" may actually incur time and/or money costs to avoid the outcomes (e.g. 
by purchasing water-filtering equipment, or by shipping unfluoridated water from another 
region). 
 
It is also noteworthy that none of the elements in categories (a) or (c) conflicts with the 
definitions of health promotion cited previously, perhaps with the exception of World Health 6 
Organization (1984). Recall that this particular definition included the statement that health 
promotion involves "enabling people to increase control over…their health". Since elements 
of category (b), such as water fluoridation, may actually decrease the control of individuals 
over their health (by reducing the consumer's capacity to choose between alternative 
consumption patterns), these may be inconsistent with the World Health Organization's 
(1984) conception of health promotion.  
 
The preceding discussion draws upon several illustrative examples of the variety of 
conceptions of "health promotion" that exist in the literature. Although further variations on 
this theme are possible, their discussion is subject to diminishing returns. It is useful, though, 
to summarise the key differences between the two general conceptions of the field that appear 
to dominate. These are usefully summarised by invoking a distinction between necessary and 
sufficient conditions. For some authors, e.g. Tones (1985), a concern with health 
improvement qualifies an activity for the use of the descriptor "health promotion", i.e. "health 
improvement" is a sufficient condition. For others, e.g. Downie, et al. (1990), a concern for 
health improvement is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. The latter genre is clearly 
more exclusive than the former: definitions of this kind generally exclude at least curative and 
acute medical services (see, e.g. Downie et al., 1990) and sometimes also exclude preventive 
interventions that involve the services of medical practitioners, such as vaccinations (see, e.g. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1980). 
 
With these distinctions in mind, attention is now directed to an economic interpretation of 
health promotion which, inter alia, attempts to place a spectrum of non-economic views of 
health and non-health production in an economic framework. 
 
3.  AN ECONOMIC CONCEPTION OF HEALTH PROMOTION 
 
In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other 
employment…subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords 
occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in 
philosophy, as well as in every other business, improves dexterity, and saves time (Smith, 1776, 
p.23). 
 
A working definition of health promotion is required for the purposes of this paper. In 
arriving at such a definition, it is useful to recall Bob Evans's (1984) argument regarding the 
delineation of the field of health economics from other sub-disciplines of economics: his 
treatment of that issue was also essentially concerned with a distinction between necessary 
and sufficient conditions. Specifically, he argued that, if the economics of all activities that 
affect health were considered part of health economics, health economics would rapidly 
become the "economics of everything". Consequently, Evans (1984) argued for a more 
exclusive, and arguably more useful, definition of health economics as that area of economics 
that is concerned with goods and services produced primarily for the purposes of improving 
health. 
 
A similar approach is useful in relation to health promotion. For the purposes of this paper 
health promotion is defined as that set of activities that is designed to affect the consumption 
of goods and services, primarily for the purposes of enhancing health, or preventing illness. 
It is important to note the emphasis this definition places on consumption: it presupposes 
consumption or, more specifically, the modification of consumption, is the mechanism via 7 
which health promotion programs operate. This definition thus excludes medical services, 
including those that are "preventive" in nature; but it encapsulates efforts to affect the 
consumption of such services. For example, vaccinations per se, are deemed outside the 
scope of health promotion, according to this definition. However, programs that are designed 
to encourage immunisation are not outside its scope. By contrast, note that programs such as 
water fluoridation  are  excluded: although programs of this kind effect changes to 
consumption, they do not do so via the mechanism of choice. The above definition thus 
differs from the definitions of the Department of Health and Human Services (1980) and the 
World Health Organization (1984), for example. 
 
With this definition in mind, it is pertinent to consider mechanisms via which consumer 
choices can be affected. According to consumer demand theory (see, e.g. Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980) and household production theory (Becker, 1965), consumption patterns are 
affected by (i) consumer preferences; (ii) consumer knowledge; (iii); relative prices; (iv) the 
contents of the opportunity (or choice) set(s); and (v) the budget constraint. Mechanisms (iii) 
through (v) are often closely related, but distinctions between them are appropriate, since this 
paper invokes the useful distinction between market goods consumption and household 
production. 
 
If health promotion is a set of activities that is designed to affect consumption patterns (for a 
specific purpose), mechanisms (i) to (v) represent an array of potential policy instruments for 
health promoters. Specifically, the relevant policy instruments are those that affect health-
related consumption and hence the household production of health and non-health outputs. A 
more detailed consideration of these consumption-production activities is central to the 
analyses presented in this paper. 
 
The definition of health promotion that has been invoked here suggests that an important 
health promotion target is health, per se. It is important to point out, in this context, that a 
variety of motivations may be consistent with the pursuit of a given target. For example, 
policies that are health-improving could be motivated by a desire to maximise social welfare, 
as this term is used in the conventional discourse of welfare economics. In such cases, health 
is simply an intermediate target of policy. However, a variety of factors other than welfare 
maximisation can also motivate health policy (see, e.g. Feldstein, 1998) and, indeed, public 
policy more generally (for an overview of the latter, see, e.g. Cullis & Jones (1992)). The 
teleological objective of some health policy might, in fact, be to maximise health (however 
measured) per se. On the other hand, Lewis (1996), for example, has argued that technocratic, 
rather than economic (or health), considerations are responsible for the determination of 
Australia's guidelines on water quality. Alternatively, the goals of policy makers may be to 
maximise prestige, pay, power, etc., as Niskanen (1968, 1971) has suggested. In the latter 
case, the relationships between policy targets and the utility of the bureaucrat are central. 
 
In this paper, a distinction is drawn between health promotion programs that are motivated by 
the goal of welfare maximisation, and those that are not. For simplicity, the former will be 
referred to as "welfarist" (as that term is used by Culyer, 1991) health promotion programs, 
and the latter will be referred to as "non-welfarist" health promotion programs. This latter, 
non-welfarist conception, is explicitly introduced to acknowledge that objectives other than 
social welfare maximisation could motivate health promotion policies. This is a scenario that, 
more generally, is associated with the "public choice" school in economics, in which there is 
a 8 
...presumption that persons in their roles as "public choosers", whether as constituency members or political 
agents, retain essentially the same behavioral characteristics that they exhibit in their nonpublic 
roles...(Buchanan, 1999, p.126); 
 
and, this presumption gives rise to the prediction that 
 
...persons, singly or in groups, will seek to further their own interests as they participate in the public and in the 
private economy (Buchanan, 1999, p.127). 
 
The purpose of this acknowledgement, in the current paper, is not to paint a unidimensional 
portrait of lazy and "self-aggrandizing" bureaucrats (Musgrave, 1999), but to acknowledge 
that a variety of items, other than (but perhaps including) social welfare maximisation, could 
enter the utility function of the health promoter.  
 
To fix ideas, it is useful to refer to the economic literature on the theory of the firm. In 
economics, it is typically assumed that firms seek to maximise profits. However, economists 
have also explored the implications of a range of other objectives, including sales 
maximisation (Baumol, 1958); growth (or discounted future sales) maximisation 
(Williamson, 1966), output maximisation (in the specific context of Soviet enterprises) 
(Ames, 1965); and numerous others (see, e.g., the collection of papers in Archibald (1971)). 
 
In relation to the task at hand in this paper, it is useful to recall the bureaucrat's utility 
function that was employed by Ames (1965). The utility function for the Soviet bureaucrat 
included both profit  and output arguments, and these were afforded utility weights. At a 
general level, the ideas behind Ames's conception of the Soviet enterprise are usefully 
employed, in the present context, to distinguish the non-welfarist and welfarist cases referred 
to above. Abstracting from inter-temporal dimensions of Grossman's (1972) model (including 
the notions of a "service flow" of healthy days and health stock depreciation), suppose the 
utility function of each of the  j individuals in the society, in the purview  of the health 
promoter, may be re-written as follows: 
 
j j j j j Z H U ) 1 ( a a - + =   (1), 
 
where U is utility, a j and (1-a j ) are the utility weights of the jth individual, Hj is the health 
stock of the jth individual at a given point in time, and Zj is the jth individual's non-health 
consumption at that point in time. Suppose that we may then write the health promoter's 
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where aHP and (1-aHP) are the health promoter's utility weights on the H and Z consumption 
of the j individuals. In addition to their "instantaneous" nature, utility functions (1) and (2) 
entail several simplifying abstractions. First, Equation (1) abstracts from possible utility 
interdependencies between the j individuals. Second, equation (2) abstracts from any utility 
derived by the health promoter from his/her own consumption of H and Z. When aHP takes 
values between zero and unity, the indifference curves of the health promoter take on familiar 
characteristics. However, in the special cases when aHP=0, or aHP=1, the indifference curves 9 
of the health promoter will be straight lines, parallel to the relevant axes. These issues will be 
taken up later in some detail, in geometric expositions. 
 
Now, consider the fundamental difference between the utility function given by Equation (2), 
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The utility function described by Equation (2) indicates that the health promoter's utility 
derives from both the pattern and the levels of consumption of H and Z by the j individuals 
in the population. By contrast, the utility function given by Equation (3) indicates that the 
utility of the health promoter derives, not from consumption patterns of individuals per se, 
but the utility that each of the j individuals derives from his/her own consumption pattern. 
Thus, in the language employed above, Equation (2) represents the utility function of a "non-
welfarist" health promoter, while Equation (3) represents the utility function of a "welfarist" 
health promoter. While, in the former case, it is the health promoter's utility weights, aHP and 
(1-aHP), that "matter" in the formulation of policy, it is the utility weights a j and (1-aj) of 
individuals, that "matter" in the welfarist case. 
 
It is useful to explore the implications of different assumptions about the values of a by 
considering some extreme cases. First, consider Figure 1, in which aHP is assumed to take the 
value of unity. In this case, the health promoter's preferences are lexicographic: s/he derives 
zero utility from the non-health consumption of individuals, so MRTSZH = ¥, and his/her 
indifference curves in Figure 1, e.g. IOHP1 through IOHP3, are straight lines, parallel to the x-
axis. Suppose that the curve marked PPFj, in Figure 1, describes the H and Z production 
possibilities for the jth individual in the relevant society. (Note that HMIN, the minimum health 
stock, is non-zero by assumption, i.e. it is assumed that the health stock is non-zero, even if 
no health inputs are used.)  The health promoter's indifference curves provide a corner 
solution for the health promoter at V: the utility of the health promoter is maximised when Hj 
= HMAX and Z = 0. (Indeed, when the health promoter's preferences are of the form depicted in 
Figure 1, a health-maximising corner solution will always arise, provided the PPFj is strictly 
concave to the origin.) 
 
Now consider Figure 2, which presents PPFj and indifference curves for the jth individual, 
marked IOj1
 through IOj3. In this extreme case, a j = 0, and the jth individual's MRSZH
 = 0. 
This assumption (well-summarised by the adage "Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we 
die") gives rise to indifference curves that are parallel to the y-axis, and the selection of 
output bundle K = ZMAX, HMIN. Note that this extreme case results in non-zero health stock, by 
assumption. 
 
Figure 3 presents another extreme, viz. that in which (1 - aHP) < 0. This case, in which the 
health promoter derives disutility from  Zj consumption, gives rise to  MRSZH  < 0, and 
generates positively-sloped indifference curves for the health promoter. As was the case in 
Figure 1, a "health-stock-maximising" solution arises at V. A health-maximising solution is 
inevitable when preferences take this form, even if the PPFj is not strictly concave to the 
origin. (The UHP-maximising basket may not, however, be a true "corner" solution if the PPFj 
is not strictly concave: i.e. the basket contain some Z, in such cases.) 10 
Figure 1  
Lexicographic preferences for a health promoter, expressed over the health (H) and 
non-health (Z) consumption of individual j 
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Finally, and without geometry, one can imagine the "intermediate" cases in which health 
promoters and individuals have utility weights 0 < a < 1. The critical issue then becomes to 
what extent the utility weights of health promoters and individuals in their purview differ, and 
the extent to which the health promoter can use his/her budget to affect the composition of the 
output bundles of those individuals. 
 
In the welfarist case, since the health promoter's utility is a function of the utilities of the j 
individuals there is no divergence, absent market failure, of the views of the health promoter 
and of individuals, about the composition of the "optimal" output bundles. An important 
implication of this observation is as follows: if the teleological purpose of health promotion is 
welfarist (i.e., to maximise welfare), market failure in the health sector is a  necessary 
condition  for the institution of a health promotion "intervention". All health promotion 
programs that are motivated by welfarist considerations will, essentially, be programs to 
correct inefficiencies that arise due to the existence of externalities, public goods, problems of 
information, or problems of market power. The targets of welfarist health promotion 
initiatives become quite clear: they are the sources of market failure that are responsible for 
distorting the health-related decisions of individuals, and thereby reducing their utilities. 
 
By contrast, if the teleological end of health promotion is non-welfarist in nature market 
failure is not even a necessary condition for health promotion "interventions". Instead, the 
selection of targets and use of the instruments of health promotion are manifestations of 
health promoter's own consumption weights over health and non-health outputs, subject to 
whatever resource constraints (e.g. the health promoter's budget constraint and other 
institutional constraints) are applicable.
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3.1  Grossman's Health Stock Model and Some Further Geometry 
 
Henceforth, the analysis is primarily geometric. The framework to be employed is inspired by 
Hadley's (1982) and Wagstaff's (1986) graphical interpretations of Grossman's 1972) model; 
and they are, as such, primarily of a comparative static nature. The intertemporal dimensions 
of the Grossman (1972) model are explicitly acknowledged. However the focus of this paper 
is on consumer decisions and outcomes in adjacent time periods and, for the purposes of 
simplification, some temporal dimensions of the Grossman (1972) model (e.g., health stock 
depreciation, and healthy days service flows) are not given explicit treatment. 
 
Figure 4 presents a stylised representation of (part of) Grossman's (1972) model. Quadrant I 
contains the health production function of an individual (the j subscript is now suppressed, for 
convenience): it relates the consumption of health inputs to the production of health stock. 
The function is assumed not only to become subject to diminishing marginal returns in the 
health input (HI) but also, eventually, zero marginal returns (at HIE) and, finally, negative 
marginal returns (for HI>HIE). HMAX thus represents the maximum producible health stock 
for the individual, with an input requirement of HIE. 
 
Quadrant II contains an indifference curve, IO2, for the individual, drawn over output space. 
The pertinent outputs are health stock (H) and non-health consumption (Z). Thus, indifference 
curves in this space represent the consumer-producer's (hereinafter, simply "the individual's") 
"underlying" preferences for health and other consumption. The fundamental nature of the 
preferences depicted in Quadrant II deserves emphasis: the consumer's input preferences are 
derivative of his/her (i) preferences over outputs; and (ii) his/her understanding of the 
technologies of health production and non-health production. 
Quadrant III presents the non-health production function, NHPF. For analytical convenience, 
it is assumed that the non-health production function is homogeneous of degree one, yielding 
a linear function in non-health input (NHI)-Z space. It is also assumed, for convenience, but 
without loss of generality, that the production function has a zero intercept and unit-slope. 
The ray from the origin produced by these assumptions has a slope of 45￿, which enables 
NHPF to serve as a reference line to Quadrants II and IV. 
 
Quadrant IV presents one of an infinite number of input indifference curves,  IIN1. The 
relevant inputs are NHI and HI and, as indicated above, the consumer's preferences over them 
are derived from the relationships in Quadrants I-III. For example, the output combinations U 
and  V, on  IO2, correspond with input combinations  W and  T, respectively, on  IIN1. The 
indifference curve IO2 has the properties generally expected of a conventional indifference 
curve for two goods and hence it is strictly convex to the origin. Note, however, that IIN2 is 
not strictly convex to the origin. Rather, for combinations on  IIN2  where HI > HIE, the 
marginal rate of substitution of health input for non-health input (MRSHI NHI =  HI NHI ¶ ¶ / ) 
becomes zero, and then changes sign (i.e., MRSHI NHI =  HI NHI ¶ ¶ - / ). This non-convexity 
arises due to the fact that increments of HI>HIE do not increase, and then actually reduce, the 
stock of health, while simultaneously decreasing non-health production-consumption 
possibilities. Thus, in the region of  HI > HIE  health inputs are output- and hence utility-
decreasing ("bads") and their consumption must be compensated by increasing other 
consumption ( Z) to maintain constant utility. In input space, this demands an increased 
allocation in NHI. 
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Figure 4 
Consumer"s preferences expressed over health inputs and derived from preferences 
over health stock and non-health consumption 
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The utility-maximising output combination(s), and the corresponding optimum input 
bundle(s) cannot be discerned from Figure 4. Information about the consumer's budget 
constraint must also be introduced. Figure 5 presents the consumer's budget line 
(HIMAX1NHIMAX1 ), in Quadrant IV and, in Quadrant II the production-possibilities frontier 
(PPF) for the individual has been derived. The PPF derives from the budget constraint and 
the technical relationships in Quadrants II and III. For example, its intercepts, HMAX and ZMAX, 
are found by taking corner solutions on the inputs budget line, at  HIMAX1  and  NHIMAX1, 
respectively. Note that the latter input corner solution produces the output bundle K (=ZMAX, 
HMIN>0). This outcome arises due to the assumption evident from the positive intercept on 
HPF (in Quadrant I), viz. that the stock of health will be non-zero, even if the consumption of 
health inputs is zero. 14 
Figure 5 
Output and input equilibria for health production 
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Given the state of technology, the relative prices of inputs, the consumer's preferences, and 
the budget depicted in Figure 5, the bundle C* (=H*, Z*) is uniquely utility-maximising, or 
the "welfarist" outcome. Thus, in the absence of market failure, the consumer will choose the 
input bundle P* (=HI*, NHI*) and produce the utility-maximising output bundle C*. (This 
C* basket will serve as an important reference point for the remainder of the geometric 
analysis.) 
 
How can the role of health promotion be depicted in this framework? 
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3.2  INSTRUMENTS AND TARGETS OF WELFARIST HEALTH PROMOTION 
STRATEGIES 
 
According to the welfarist conception of health promotion presented above, health promotion 
policies have no role to play in a world that is devoid of market failure. Assuming a utilitarian 
social welfare function, if individuals attain their utility-maxima without public intervention, 
government intervention will not Pareto-improve social welfare.  
 
If markets do fail, though, the resulting utility losses may be large enough to warrant 
government intervention. Specifically, when the benefits of helping individuals to make 
efficient resource allocation objectives (that are also consistent with the preferences of those 
individuals), exceed the costs, there is an economic (welfarist) case for intervention. This part 
of the paper is concerned with illustrating several health promotion policies that are 
motivated by welfarist considerations. In each case, the emphasis is on the source and 
outcomes of market failure and the mechanisms for its correction.  
 
3.2.1  Market Failure: An Example with Imperfect Information 
 
In Figure 5, the output equilibrium was shown to depend on an optimal division of the total 
budget between health and non-health inputs. Optimal input allocation was shown to depend, 
in turn, on the individual's (implicitly perfect) knowledge of the technologies for the 
production of health and other goods. If individuals are not well informed about the 
technologies of production, however, their resulting input choices may be sub-optimal. 
Expressed another way, imperfect knowledge can give rise to market failure in the markets 
under consideration and, just as for other sectors of the economy, an economic argument can 
be made in such cases for public intervention. In this section, applications of two types of 
policy instrument, viz. information provision, and taxes and subsidies, are explored. 
 
3.2.2  Information Dissemination  
 
Information provision is one of the instruments available to governments when markets fail 
due to problems of information. Some of the most visible health promotion activities might 
be justified on such grounds. Elements of the HIV/AIDS media campaigns of the 1980s, 
arguably fall into the category of information provision. It may be argued that the purpose of 
those campaigns was to obviate a specific source of market failure, viz. imperfect knowledge 
about a disease and modes of its transmission. Programs that are designed to disseminate 
accurate information about the relationships between health and diet, exercise, consumption 
of medical and preventive health care services, and so on, are other examples of this type of 
health promotion policy. 
 
Figure 6 presents an analysis of the economic role played by welfarist health promotion 
policies involving the provision of information. Here, it is assumed that the consumer is 
perfectly informed about the technology of non-health production. It is also assumed, 
however, that the consumer is ill-informed about the state of health production technology. 
Suppose that HPF again represents the "true" health production relationship, but that the 
individual mistakenly believes the relationship is that indicated by the dashed line, HPFD. 
This individual (who "doesn't know much about health production" (Quadrant I), but "knows 
what s/he likes" (Quadrant II)) has an input indifference map (e.g., IIND in Quadrant IV) that  16 
Figure 6 
Knowledge poverty (/misinformation) and disequilibrium in health production 
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is distorted by his/her misunderstanding of the health production function. How are the 
consumer's choices and welfare affected by his/her ignorance? 
 
This individual will choose input combination Q* (Quadrant IV), because s/he expects it to 
produce the bundle D (=HD,ZD ; in Quadrant II). Although D is inferior to C*, the consumer's 
knowledge-poverty misleads him/her to the conclusion that it is the highest-utility bundle that 
can be produced given the (perceived) technology and the budget constraint. However, the 
bundle produced as a result of this budget allocation will not be  D, but  F: the realised 
production of H will be greater than expected. Although bundle F provides greater utility than 
D, it is still inferior to the utility-maximising bundle, C*. Moreover, because health stock is 
non-tradeable, the consumer cannot augment utility by making ex post trades along the PPF. 17 
The individual's ignorance of the true relationship between HI and H is thus a source of 
welfare loss. 
 
As an aside, it is worthwhile noting that, although F is not a utility-maximising basket, its 
attainment does produce some information about health production that the individual 
previously did not possess. In subsequent periods, the consumer's learning might be brought 
to bear on his/her production activities and input allocations so that, by trial and error, the 
output equilibrium may eventually be achieved. However, the process of discovery of the 
"true" production relationship could be protracted and/or expensive. The process may be 
especially costly, in terms of utility forgone, if (i) the individual misinterprets the information 
produced (e.g., as the result of stochastic shocks); (ii) the health production technology 
changes over time; and/or (iii) the rate of health stock depreciation changes with age, 
confounding the signals received. Furthermore, for various conditions of ill-health, the 
consequences of market failure might be catastrophic if the first opportunity that knowledge-
poor individuals have to learn about the relationship between consumption choices and their 
health consequences arrives too late. 
 
Generally, as the cost of locating the health production function grows, so too does the 
economic case for public intervention. In the absence of externalities, the welfare benefits of 
information-disseminating health promotion activities may be conceived in terms of the 
utility gained by individuals whose search for equilibrium is shortened, as a result of them. 
The target of health promotion in this (welfarist) case, is the consumer's knowledge state 
regarding health production; the instrument for its achievement is information dissemination 
(or "education"); and the welfarist objective is, as always, to augment utility, and hence 
welfare. (The net benefits of public provision may also be increased by the public good 
attributes of health information.) 
 
3.2.3  Taxes and Subsidies 
 
An alternative to that outlined above is to levy taxes and/or subsidies on inputs. Specifically, 
the relative prices of health and non-health inputs can be manipulated in such a way as to 
bring the information-poor consumer immediately to his/her output equilibrium.  
 
Figure 7 presents an example that is based on the budget constraint and preference sets 
indicated in Quadrant IV of Figure 6 (other Quadrants are suppressed). The consumer's initial 
budget constraint, from Figure 6, is NHIMAX1HIMAX1, and the full-information indifference 
curve for inputs is  IIN2. Recall that, if the consumer were well-informed about the 
technologies of H and Z production, s/he would have allocated his/her budget to Q* (=HI*, 
NHI*). However, misinformed input preferences lead to the mistaken choice of P* (=NHID, 
HID). The visible hand of government (Chandler, 1977), manifest as a goods and services or 
value-added tax and/or subsidy on inputs, can optimally redirect the budget allocation. For 
example, the prices implied by the budget line NHIMAX2HIMAX2 will effect the consumption of 
Q
* by the consumer. Thus, the effective policy involves a tax on health inputs, and a subsidy 
non-health inputs. Notably, although the policy is utility-improving in output space (since it is 
consistent with the output bundle C* in Quadrant II, in Figure 6), the input tangency Q* 
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Figure 7 shows how applications of taxes and/or subsidies can be used as instruments of 
"health promotion" when market failure by information occurs. However, for pragmatic 
reasons, these are not likely to be efficient instruments to employ when information is the 
source of market failure. The practical difficulties are first, that the requirement for 
information about consumer preferences is formidable: to formulate efficient policy, the 
health promoter must be as good a judge of individual welfare as the individual concerned! 
Second, since health policy is constituted over groups of individuals, with inevitably 
heterogeneous preferences, generalising such a policy involves tailoring tax and subsidy 
provisions, perhaps even at the level of individuals.
 
 
It is noteworthy that the previous two Figures illustrate cases in which efficiency is promoted 
by applying instruments that actually lead to a reduction in the consumption of health inputs. 
This analytical outcome is deliberate. It is designed to illustrate the fact that, in some (perhaps 19 
"special") cases, health policies that are motivated by welfarist concerns do not invariably 
result in increased health input consumption. 
 
The tax and subsidy instruments discussed above can also be used to pursue other, non-
welfarist, health promotion ends. The focus of the paper is now directed to a discussion of 
such ends and some policy applications. 
 
3.3   Non-Welfarist Health Promotion Strategies 
 
Consider Figure 8, in which the (non-welfarist) health promoter's indifference curve, IOHP, in 
Quadrant II, is added to the framework used for Figures 6 and 7. The form of this dashed 
indifference curve (kinked at the point F) suggests a special case that has not previously been 
considered, viz. that in which aHP is not a constant, but depends in part on the quantity of H 
the individual has. Specifically, for H > HF, aHP <1; while, for H<HF, aHP = 1 (and hence 
indifference curves lower than  IOHP  (not depicted) are lines parallel to the  x-axis). This 
formulation assumes health target-setting behaviour, rather than health maximisation, on the 
part of the health promoter. The remaining analyses suppose that the health promoter's utility 
function is of this nature, although the conclusions are insensitive to this idiosyncratic (or, 
some may say, "Marie Antionettesque") preference formulation. 
 
From the point of view of the health promoter, the utility-maximising output bundle in Figure 
8 is  F, in Quadrant II. Its production demands that the  jth individual select the input 
combination ( R=HF,HIF). T he critical observation to be drawn from Figure 8 is that the 
individual's equilibrium, C, represents disequilibrium to the non-welfarist health promoter 
(and vice versa). Attention is now directed to some mechanisms by which the health promoter 
might affect increases in his/her utility, by changing the composition of the jth individual's 
output bundle. 
 
3.3.1  Disinformation, Misinformation, Reinforcement, and Exaggeration as 
  Policy Instruments 
 
The health promoter could attempt to affect the individual's basic preferences over H and Z, 
so that individual's preferences, and equilibrium, are identical (or closer) to those of the health 
promoter. In order to do so, the intrinsic values the individual places on health and other 
consumption must be affected. How might this be done? Perhaps an advertising strategy that 
extols the virtues of a particular lifestyle may be undertaken in an attempt to change the 
preferences of individuals for "health", itself (i.e. to affect the individual's  MRTSZH). 
Geometrically, s uch strategies can be depicted as attempts to change the slopes of the 
individual's output indifference curves (e.g., in Quadrant II of Figure 8) so that F represents a 
tangency between the existing PPF and the individual's "reformed" indifference curves. (The 
geometric exposition is not provided here, for reasons of space.) 
 
Another strategy involves manipulating the preferences of individuals over health and non-
health inputs to achieve the health promoter's utility-maximising bundle. The instruments that 
might be used to effect this change, in input space, are (i) non-information strategies; and (ii) 
disinformation strategies, which are designed to persuade individuals to allocate more of the 
budget to health inputs than is actually utility-maximising. Category (i) includes advertising 
campaigns that are designed to modify the consumption of commodities via 
persuasion/reinforcement, rather than the provision of novel information. The mandated  20 
Figure 8 
"Non-welfarist" health promotion: an advertising strategy that impacts on attitudes to 
health and other consumption 
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warnings on cigarette packets (e.g., "Smoking Kills", "Smoking Causes Heart Disease", 
"Smoking Causes Lung Cancer", and so on) are, perhaps, examples. 
 
Category (ii) includes programs that are designed to exaggerate the perceived risks, costs, or 
benefits, of particular consumption decisions. The exaggerated claims sometimes made by 
private, profit-maximising, firms perhaps spring readily to mind in this regard. However, 
public health authorities may also pursue strategies of this nature or, at least, strategies that 
result in exaggerated perceptions of health risks. Some further elaboration on this point is 
provided, below.  
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Although these non-welfarist strategies involve the dissemination of data, they are motivated 
by the pursuit of a health objective, not the welfare-maximising objective. Strategies (i) and 
(ii) are designed to affect individuals' preferences over inputs. Geometrically, this implies 
changing the slopes of the indifference curves in Quadrant IV (i.e., consumers' marginal rates 
of substitution of health for non-health inputs). Recall that the input indifference curves in 
Quadrant IV are derived from the information about output preferences and production 
technologies contained in Quadrants I-III. Thus, the mechanism for strategies (i) and (ii) is the 
modification of consumer knowledge (by misinformation) about health production 
technology. The case can be understood by returning to Figure 6, and recalling that HPFD 
represented the individual's distorted view of the "true" health production relationship HPF. It 
was supposed above that such distortions could be created by the deliberate provision of 
misinformation and/or by exaggeration. In such cases, one might view  HPFD, not as the 
product of ignorance, but the product of misinformation that forms part of a non-welfarist 
health promotion policy to improve health. Its effects are to distort input preferences (IIND), 
giving rise to the consumption of Q*, and the production of F. This bundle maximises the 
health promoter's utility, but is strictly inferior to C*, from the individual's point of view. 
 
3.3.2  Taxes and Subsidies 
 
Taxes and subsidies may also be used as non-welfarist instruments of health promotion. 
Figure 9 provides an example of the impact of taxes and subsidies on individual choices and 
outcomes. The initial inputs budget line is  NHIMAX1HIMAX1. The production-consumption 
possibilities for the individual are given by the dotted-curve marked PPF in Quadrant II. The 
individual's initial input and output equilibria are P* and C*, respectively.  
 
In order to give rise to the input equilibrium, R, which produces the output bundle F, the 
relative prices of health and non-health inputs must be changed. The relative price ratio that 
will lead this individual to choose F is the ratio given by the budget line AB (in Quadrant IV). 
An important impact of the tax and subsidy arrangements implied by AB is that they change 
the production-consumption possibilities (or "opportunity set") for the individual. For 
example, even if the entire budget is spent on non-health production-consumption, the 
resulting basket contains only ZT, compared with the pre-tax-subsidy possibility of ZMAX . The 
individual's post-tax-and-subsidy production possibilities are given by PPF2 which coincides 
with PPF only for baskets where H>HF. Notably, all bundles that contain H<HF contain less 
Z than was produced prior to the introduction of the tax on non-health inputs. The y-axis 
intercept of PPF2, HMAX1, is identical to that of PPF: the marginal product of health input 
quantities HI>HIE is zero, or negative (and HIE was available to the individual before the 
introduction of the tax and subsidy arrangements (HIMAX1 > HIE)). The individual's post-tax-
and-subsidy output equilibrium is thus F, which maximises the utility of the health promoter. 
Notably, F is an inferior basket to C*, in the view of the individual consumer-producer, 
because F occurs on a lower indifference curve (IO2) to C* (on IO1).  
 
3.3.3  Quantity Controls 
 
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider non-price limitations on opportunity sets. Such 
limitations are, in fact, commonplace and include measures such as place-specific bans on 
smoking and the consumption of alcohol, as well as embargoes on the consumption (and 
production) of drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and so on. Although negative externalities (such 
as the effects of passive smoking, for example) may provide some welfarist justifications for  22 
Figure 9 
Taxes and subsidies as instruments of "non-welfarist" health promoters 
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the institution of quantity limits, i.e. quantity limits that are potential-Pareto-improving, the 
institution of quantity controls can also be motivated by other (non-welfarist) objectives.  
 
Consider Figure 10, which contains many of the elements of Figure 9 and in which the 
individual's equilibrium is given, initially, by  C* (Quadrant II) and  P* (Quadrant IV). 
Suppose that the health promoter's (utility-maximising) goal is, once again, for the individual 
consume bundle F. A consumption quota on non-health inputs could be introduced to modify 
the individual's opportunity set and effect the production of output bundle F. Specifically, a 
non-health inputs quota of NHIQ will render the individual's inputs budget constraint HIMAX1 
NHIQ. The effect of the quota is to kink the budget line at R, which is then tangent to IIN2.  23 
Figure 10 
A non-health inputs consumption quota as an instrument of health promotion 
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The quota renders the budget line perpendicular to the y-axis for all HI<HIF and the new 
production-consumption possibilities are given by the transformation function PPF2.  
 
A notable characteristic of PPF2 is that it is parallel to the y-axis for all H<HF, indicating the 
impossibility of transformations of H for Z in this region, due to the imposition the quota. 
Thus,  F becomes the utility-maximising combination for the individual, but leaves the 
consumer with less utility than at C*. 
The converse of the policy just discussed involves the public provision, perhaps at the zero 
price, of a good or service that is health-improving. As with the policies discussed previously, 
this instrument could be applied to achieve a target that is motivated by either welfarist 
considerations (e.g., to correct the sub-optimal provision of a public good), or non-welfarist 24 
considerations. Such policies, although not depicted geometrically here, pivot the inputs 
budget constraint at the NHI intercept, increasing HIMAX1. In output space, the effect is to 
pivot the PPF at its Z intercept, increasing the H intercept, provided the marginal product of 
health inputs is positive. 
 
3.4   A Further Note on Non-Welfarist Health Promotion Strategies 
 
Every tobacco death is preventable. That is [the Tobacco Free Initiative's] message and challenge 
(World Health Organization, 2001, http://tobacco.who.int). 
 
A detailed empirical analysis of the stated objectives, instruments, targets, and consequences 
(e.g., in terms of welfare, health-stock, etc.) of a range of health promotion programs is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, lest the non-welfarist notions expressed above be 
thought chimerical, it is useful to set them in an empirical context. In the interests of brevity, 
attention will be focussed exclusively on the World Health Organization's "Tobacco Free 
Initiative (TFI)" (World Health Organization, 2001). In particular, the apparent objectives, 
targets and instruments associated with this Initiative will be explored, alongside some 
pertinent academic literature on tobacco consumption. The treatment is not exhaustive, but is 
designed to illustrate some apparent examples of the non-welfarist issues discussed above.
1 
 
The TFI is an international program that was launched by the World Health Organization 
“cabinet” late 2000. The French-language title of the World Health Organization's TFI, i.e. 
Initiative Pour un Monde Sans Tabac, is perhaps more lucid than its English-language 
counterpart. Taken together with the proclamation of the TFI's purpose (cited above), there is 
little room for interpretation: the target/objective of the TFI is to reduce the number of 
tobacco deaths to zero. The ideal via which this target is to be achieved is the creation of a 
worldwide environment that is tobacco free.  
 
Although it may be possible to construct a welfarist case in support of the TFI’s 
objectives/targets, such a case has (i) not been presented in the TFI documentation (see World 
Health Organization, 2001, http://tobacco.who.int, linked pages and documents); and (ii) 
appears difficult to extract from their contents. The competing thesis is that the TFI is 
motivated by non-welfarist considerations. To this end, it may be proposed that the target and 
objective of the TFI are one and the same: to eradicate tobacco deaths. Additionally, the 
(idealistic) means stated for achieving this target,  viz. the eradication of tobacco  per se, 
appears consistent with some of the general non-welfarist strategies that were described above 
(e.g., quantity controls, taxes, subsidies). 
 
At a more pragmatic level, the World Health Organization (2001) provides some advice on 
instruments of TFI policy, including "media advocacy" programs. Advocacy, according to the 
World Health Organization (2001,  http://tobacco.who.int/en/ advocacy/definitions.html)  
 
... is the pursuit of influencing (sic.) outcomes - including public policy and resource allocation 




...requires both affirmative policy advocacy and aggressive counteraction to opposition strategies and 
tactics. In fact, a media advocacy campaign resembles a political campaign, in which the competing 25 
forces continuously react to the evolving media environment, leading stories, unexpected events, and 
breaking news (World Health Organization, 2001, http://tobacco.who.int/en/advocacy/index.html). 
 
The following passage provides further illumination about the nature of the 'information' to 
be disseminated: 
 
That tobacco use causes disease and death must be heralded by the media, as often as possible, 
and in as dramatic a story as possible. But it is not merely the volume of news that determines an 
issue's ascension onto the policy agenda...the frame is the central organizing principle that structures 
meaning...it signals to people how to think about an issue, not merely what issue to think about 
(World Health Organization, 2001, http://tobacco.who.int/en/advocacy/principle.html, emphasis 
added).  
 
The moderating effects of consumer preferences and knowledge on the impact of this 
message (on tobacco consumption) are also addressed. In a list of the "five most common 
mistakes associated with public interest campaigns" two of the "mistakes" listed, and their 
narratives, are as follows: 
 
...[Mistake number] 2. The public opinion is the message.  
 
Remember that the public's understanding of an issue is often what you are up against, 
not where you want to end up; while you need to connect to public opinion, you do not 
need to repeat faulty models and further reinforce them. 
 
... [Mistake number] 4. All people need are the facts, or more facts. 
 
Remember that, until you change the frame, the facts will not add up to a change in 
attitude or policy preference  (World Health  Organization, 2001, 
http://tobacco.who.int/en/advocacy/principle.html, emphasis added). 
 
Arguably, it is difficult a welfarist theme is difficult to extract from these statements. Such a 
theme becomes even more difficult to construct when one considers the statements above 
alongside empirical evidence on consumers' perceptions of health risks. In particular, findings 
about risk perceptions derived from the field of cognitive psychology and recent empirical 
results in related literatures are pertinent. 
 
Viscusi's extensive research on risk perceptions and tobacco consumption is particularly 
noteworthy in the present context. Inter alia, Viscusi (1990) has found that most US smokers 
and non-smokers overestimate the risk of lung cancer due to smoking, and few underestimate 
it. Additionally, in his sample of over 3,000 individuals, he found the extent of overstimation 
to be 20 times as great as the amount of understimation of risk and, furthemore, that smokers' 
overestimates of risk are generally greater than (and statistically significantly different to) 
those of non-smokers (Viscusi, 1990). He has also found that risk overestimates are generally 
more pronounced in younger age groups (Viscusi, 1991). Finally, his results also show that 
US tobacco taxes are large enough to induce reductions in tobacco consumption that far 
exceed those which are predicted using objective/actual health risk probabilities and 
published price elasticity data (Viscusi, 1990). (Viscusi (1999) has also found that, even at the 
level of the US state, tobacco consumption is always "self-financing" – a result that may cast 
doubt on the externality-based public health arguments for further tobacco tax increases in 
that country.) 26 
Under the circumstances described above, correcting consumer perceptions of risk by 
providing information about the relationship between tobacco consumption and health 
outcomes might actually be expected to increase tobacco consumption. Information provision 
(or the provision of "more facts") might, therefore, be quite i ncompatible with the TFI 
target/objective, under these circumstances. Consider, on the other hand, the recommended 
TFI strategy of emphasising the message that "...tobacco use causes disease and death ...as 
often as possible, and in as dramatic a story as possible." The cognitive psychology literature 
provides reason to believe that such strategies might actually encourage overestimates of risk. 
Specifically, the so-called "availability heuristic"  
 
...predicts that people judge an event as more likely or more probable if it is easily brought to mind. 
For example, Slovic et al. found that survey respondents overestimated the frequency of rare causes 
of death (murder, care accidents) and underestimated the frequency of more common causes (such as 
stroke and stomach cancer). Overestimates may have occurred because [the former] were more 
dramatic or sensational (Lloyd, 2001, i14, emphasis added). 
 
Indeed, that such upward-bias in perceptions of risk arises for highly-publicised phenomena is 
well-accepted (Fischhoff, Lichtnestein, Slovic, Derby and Keeney, 1981; Viscusi, 1998). 
Recent work by Viscusi (1997) suggests that the availability heuristic is at work in relation to 
environmental risks too; and, in another field subject to health promotion initiatives, Paul, 
Barratt, Redman, Cockburn & Lowe (1999), found that a large proportion (64.7 per cent) of a 
sample of 1000 Australian women overestimated their lifetime risk of breast cancer. In the 
context of such empirical results on risk, strategies that are designed to dramatise and raise 
the frequency of messages that pertain to smoking risk appear more compatible, in effect, 
with strategies that are designed to exaggerate risk perceptions  
 
The preceding discussion is, of course, far from conclusive about (i) the motivation for the 
TFI; and (ii) the compatibility, or otherwise, of the program with welfarist objectives. Indeed, 
it is possible to construct welfarist arguments, such as arguments of inter-temporal myopia 
(Pigou, 1932), to support components of the Initiative. The World Health Organization itself, 
however, has not sought to construct any coherent argument of the latter kind to support its 
Initiative. Thus, while inconclusive, this brief discussion illustrates some aspects of a bona 
fide  health promotion p rogram that cannot be ruled inconsistent with the non-welfarist 
notions introduced above. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
The economic conception of health promotion produced in this paper permits an analysis of 
the instruments and targets of an important sub-sector of the health economy. The analysis is 
not exhaustive, but it does illustrate the fundamental importance of policy objectives in 
relation both to the selection of health policy targets and instruments and their welfare effects. 
The general result, although familiar to welfare economists and students of the public 
economics literature, deserves emphasis in the context of health promotion programs: the 
welfare effects of public policy can be materially affected by the objective pursued by the 
policy maker. When the objective of interest is a health target, for example, only by chance is 
the result likely to constitute a welfare maximum.  
 
The conceptual results emphasise that, when policies are constituted on non-welfarist 
grounds, whether those grounds be benevolent or otherwise, it is well to recognise the related, 27 
and material, risk of generating welfare losses thereby. Programs that foster exaggerated 
views of health risks (for example), may themselves be sources of welfare loss. For these 
reasons, it is important for policy makers to be clear about the objectives, targets and 
instruments of health promotion programs. The objectives, targets and instruments of health 
promotion appear to provide fertile ground for empirical research. Furthermore, the 
relationship between health promotion programs and consumer perceptions of risk, as well as 
the impacts of these phenomena on market efficiency and market failure demand the attention 
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In Grossman's (1972) model, utility-maximising individuals face intertemporal utility 
functions that contain the stock of health and other goods and services as arguments: 
) ,... , ,..., ( 0 0 n n n n Z Z H H U U f f =   (1) 
where Ht is the stock of health in the period t, ft is the number healthy days derived per unit 
of health stock in the ith period (Grossman's "service flow"), and Zn is total consumption of 
another commodity consumed in period i. The length of the individual's life is n, and is not 
endogeneous, i.e. it depends, inter alia, on the utility-maximising choices of the individual 
between the Zi and Hi. 
Gross investment in health in any period is given by  
i i i i i H I H H d - = - +1   (2) 
where Ii is gross investment and di is the rate of depreciation in the ith period. Both the Hi and 
the Zi vectors are household-produced by combining market inputs (goods and services) and 
the individual's own-time, according to the following production functions: 
) ; , (
) ; , (
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=
  (3) 
where HIi is the goods and services input for health production (or gross investment), where 
health inputs are defined as those goods and services demanded primarily for their perceived 
impact on health status.
1 Xi is the goods and services input employed in the production of Zi, 
THi and Ti are the time inputs involved in the production of health and Zi, respectively, and Ei 
is the stock of human capital.  
For convenience, assume that production functions (3) are homogeneous of degree 
one. The gross investment production function can thus be rewritten as 
) ; ( i i i i E t g HI I =   (4) 





=  is the time input required to produce one more gross investment unit. The 

























  (5) 
The individual's "full wealth" constraint, R, is the present value of potential earnings 
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i i i i i i i i   (6) 
where Pi is the unit price of health input, Vi is the unit price of Xi, Wi is the wage rate, TLi is 
time lost to illness. Equation (6) states that the consumer's total wealth is exhausted by 
expenditure on market goods, non-market production activities, and sick time. 
The equilibrium quantities of Hi and Zi are given by maximising (1) subject to (2), (3) 
and (6). However, since H0 and di are given, the optimal quantity of health capital in the ith 
                                                 
1 This conception of the delineation of 'health' inputs from 'non-health' inputs is similar to Evans's (1984) method 
of delineating 'health economics' from other sub-sectors of the discipline of economics. 
2 Becker's (1965) model involved the specification of a 'full income' model, since Becker's theory of the 
allocation of time was not specified as an intertemporal model. 32 
period is determined directly by the optimal quantity of gross investment in the preceding 
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= p   (6) 
where  i p  is the marginal cost of gross investment in health, Gi is the marginal product of the 
health capital stock, Uhi is the marginal utility "healthy days" (U is utility, hi is the number of 
healthy days in period i), and li is the marginal utility of wealth in period i. 
 
Equation (5) determines the optimal quantity of gross investment in period i. It states that, in 
equilibrium, the utility-maximising individual will make gross investments in health capital 
until the discounted marginal cost of a marginal increment in gross investment just equals the 
discounted incremental benefit. Notably, the benefits  measured on the right-hand-side of 
equation (5) include (i) the discounted money value of the increase in total time available to 
the individual; and (ii) the discounted money equivalent of the increase in utility arising from 
an increased number of healthy days. 
 
Equation (6) provides the condition for efficient time and market good input choice for the 
production of health: in equilibrium, the ratio of the price of market health inputs to their 
marginal product will be equal to the ratio of the wage rate to the marginal product of time. 
 
 
 